Enosis Was a Stupid Idea - Part I
This is the story of a Britannic imperialist project in the orient, and how it laid the foundations for one of the world's longest lasting conflicts, and a 147-year-old political dispute
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This is the story of Russian, British and European imperialism, the decline and fall of the Ottoman Empire, the rise of philhellenism and modern Greek patriotism, and why the European settler-colonial imperialist project was always doomed to fail on Cyprus.
Part I: Prologue / Anvil of Imperialism
By the mid-1870s, the Empire of Great Britain and other European powers were faced with trying to prevent further Russian expansion into areas controlled by a weakening Sublime Ottoman State, which was struggling against a number of existential threats.1
By the process of a series of secret negotiations between the British and Ottoman Empires, starting in early 1878, the Ottoman Empire repeated its offers of 1833, 1841, and 1845 to grant Britain administrative control of the Turkish island of Cyprus, with certain strings attached, such as the payment of a yearly tributary tax, and the fervent hope that Britain, in return, would support them against further Russian expansion.
The Ottomans were handling these secret negotiations from a position of great vulnerability and desperation. They were still struggling with the deep political and diplomatic crises born from their seemingly perennial military and territorial losses, not just to the Russians, but also to repeat insurrections orchestrated by the Russian Empire and European powers, that formed different fronts to its various wars.2
Its inequality to the Imperial Russian Army, compounded with the new Modern Ottoman Army’s effective, brutal and heavy handed reactions to certain insurrections, and the contributions of poets, missions and diplomats in romanticising views of the insurrectionists, framing their efforts as struggles for independence and fights against tyranny, and bringing knowledge of Ottoman atrocities to the wider European public, this all joined the persistent propaganda by the Russian Empire and the European Powers3 which helped pave the way for a sharp rise in negative views and opposition from it’s hitherto closest ally, Great Britain.
They were, for example, during the course of these talks, still dealing with the strong negative perceptions and diplomatic fallout from their reaction to the 1876 Bulgarian April Uprising, during which they mobilised irregular başı-bozuk (bashi-bazouk) units that engaged in indiscriminate slaughter against rebels and non-combatants, resulting in the events being dubbed the “Bulgarian Horrors” and the “Crime of the Century”,4 and which led to the signing of the Treaty of San Stefano on 3 March 1878, leading to the establishment of a separate Bulgarian state under the Russian sphere of influence.
These events also served to further define the British public’s views, shaped by their strong belief in humanitarianism and the idea of a strong commitment to upholding the rights of oppressed Christian populations, and their desire to protect and expand upon the glory of the British Empire, and so the Ottoman Empire was viewed as a “tyrant” force and “a threat to peace and stability in Europe”, with many writings and speeches on the subject by various politicians, especially Liberal leader William Ewart Gladstone, helping to galvanise British public opinion against the Ottoman Empire.
Regardless, another one of the great drawbacks of the Russo-Turkish Wars, and we’ll have to go a little further back in time for this one, but especially their occurrence parallel to the Greek Revolution, which Britain, France and Russia had jointly supported, was the resulting Treaty of Adrianople (1829), which allowed Russia to occupy Moldavia and Walachia.
This ominous Russian proximity to the Çanakkale Boğazı (Dardanelles Strait) and the inability of the Ottoman Empire to oppose Russian aggression and expansion strongly increased the visceral British fears over potential Russian naval domination of the Mediterranean and control of the land route to and from the Indian Subcontinent.
This positioned the situation within the context of the wider Russian-British rivalry and great power competition, known as the Grand Game, which was essentially a struggle between the greatest naval power and the biggest land power of the time, and it was over influence in Central Asia, primarily in Afghanistan, Persia, and Tibet, and typically through the use of military interventions and diplomatic negotiations.
In that context, in response to the perceived threat the British, against the wishes of the new Sultan Abdul Hamid II, intervened in the Russo-Turkish War (1877-1878), sending a large task force representing British naval supremacy into the straits of Marmara, anchored in full view of both the Dolmabahçe Palace and the Russian army.
On the one hand, looking at the prospect of a British entry into the war the Russians decided to settle the dispute. On the other hand, the resultant Treaty of San Stefano (1878) gave Romania and Montenegro their independence, granted Serbia and Russia extra territory, gave control over Bosnia to Austria-Hungary, and Bulgaria was given almost complete autonomy, but in reality could only exist as a Russian satellite, while it was also greatly expanded, becoming a source of provocation to the Ottoman Empire and it’s neighbours, and creating what the British termed a “monster” state.
The geostrategic success of this territorial carving was further compounded with the commercial opportunity in the Ottoman Empire’s need for modern technology and superior weaponry to counter the persistent Russian threat, which Great Britain and the European powers believed could be exploited, dramatically increasing the money entering the Sublime Ottoman State via trade, and turning it into a proxy fortress preventing further Russian encroachments towards Britain’s possessions, all the while supporting the economies and strategic interests of these powers.
But perhaps most crucially Britain, viewing the Russian acquisition of the Black Sea harbour of Batumi (Batoum), and the strategically important towns of Kars, Ardahan and Bajesid in Ottoman Armenia as indicators that Russia was on track to gaining direct access to the Mediterranean, and parallel signs that Russia was moving towards Mesopotamia (Iraq) and Alexandretta (Iskenderun), directly threatening Britain’s route to India, the very Life Line of the Empire, this became a real “nightmare” to the British.
It should therefore come as no surprise that while the Treaty of San Stefano was being roundly condemned and vilified in Britain as a great “catastrophe”, and all manner of diplomatic and political effort was underway to revise it, an unlikely island started to take its share of the prominence, as Britain was exploring several “insurance” scenarios.
The British Press said the quiet part out loud when it called for the occupation of Egypt and the conversion of Cyprus into a “Gibraltar of the East” from where the British Navy could control the Syrian coast, the Suez Canal and the Straits, and an ambitious plan for a railway route, from Alexandretta to the valleys of Euphrat and Tigris, to Basra, and from there to India, could be protected from Cyprus.5
And so the British Prime Minister and his advisors began to seriously consider support for the Ottoman Empire as a way of protecting their "jewel in the crown" as it were6:
“England should support Turkey, aid her by diplomatic pressure to reform in the interests of both Christians and Mussulmans alike and thus continue to guard the route to India by maintaining the Sultan’s rule over Constantinople, the Straits, and Armenia.” - Benjamin Disraeli and Austen Henry Layard
Then after intensive discussions among the military elite, it was also decided that7:
“England might maintain Turkey at the expense of enormous blood and treasure, but what good would that do? She had better leave Turkey to her fate and seize upon some place that would be of use to her such as the Dardanelles and Cyprus.” - Colonel Robert Home (1878)
Thus Britain had started to re-evaluate Cyprus as a possible Place d’Armes, to serve as a bulwark of British influence, power projection and competition retardation in the region, and they returned to a powerful vision which was formulated 60 years before8:
“The possession of Cyprus would give England a preponderating influence in the Mediterranean, and place at her disposal the future destinies of the Levant. Egypt and Syria would soon become her tributaries, and she would acquire an overawing position in respect to Asia Minor, by which the Porte might at all times be kept in check, and the encroachments of Russia, in this quarter, retarded, if not prevented. It would increase her commerce in a very considerable degree; ... It is of easy defence; and under a liberal government would in a very short space of time, amply repay the charge of its own establishment, and afford the most abundant supplies to our fleets at a trifling expense.” - John MacDonald Kinneir (1818)
To consolidate the path to realise this grand strategy, British-lead diplomatic haggling for a revision to the San Stefano Treaty resulted in the Russians signaling they would accept a withdrawal from the Balkans and agree to a marked reduction of Bulgaria’s territory, but remain in Armenia, and this was also used as a pretext by the British to put pressure on the Sultan to conclude these secret negotiations.
They pushed for guarantees from the Ottomans on the implementation of certain reforms in favour of the Christian population, and to allow Cyprus to be occupied and administered by England, until the day Russians move out of Armenia, as well as to enter in an Anglo-Ottoman Defense Alliance, with the added promise that Great Britain would help the Sultan militarily in case of further Russian advances in Asia.
The Sultan agreed.9
Then on 4 June 1878, with the signing of the secret Anglo-Ottoman Defense Alliance, better known as the Cyprus Convention,10 the predicamented Ottomans de facto granted occupational and administrative control of the island to Great Britain, in exchange for Britain’s support “with respect to the Asiatic Provinces of Turkey” during the Congress of Berlin (1878) talks, and a degree of financial relief and protection.
And on 1 July 1878 an annex to the convention titled “Conditions of British Occupation and Administration of Cyprus” was signed at Constantinople, recognising conditions that England agreed to relating to her occupation and administration of the island of Cyprus,11 which included a conditional "annual fixed payment" by Britain to the Sultan, also known as the “Cyprus Tribute”, as a type of salvific compensation, before finally, on 7 July 1878, the Sultan signed the Firman legally ratifying the Cyprus Convention.
In essence, the Ottoman Empire's decision to give Cyprus to Britain was a calculated move rooted in strategic necessity and financial strain, but it also laid the groundwork for future complexities and challenges both within the empire and on the island itself.
Because well before the final negotiations for the signature of the Sultan under the Cyprus Convention dragged on during the sessions of the Berlin Congress, Britain had already succeeded in pushing the Russians back from the Mediterranean and halting their advances in Armenia, thus making the reasons given for the British acquisition of Cyprus null and void, well before they were even signed.
Just as Bismarck allegedly played the honest broker in Berlin, but in reality had done his best to secretly encourage the European powers to carve up the Ottoman Empire, playing off one state against the other, the British too had played the Ottomans.
Under Prime Minister Benjamin Disraeli, ever the imperialist and expansionist, they sought to part ways with Gladstone’s policy of “splendid isolation” and of building a “Concert of Europe” to support the survival of the Ottoman Empire, and instead aimed to secure British maritime dominance and passages to the Life Lines of the Empire through an Anglo-Ottoman alliance, brought the Suez Canal under British control in 1875 by buying shares of the Ottoman Egyptian Khedive, and had Queen Victoria proclaimed Empress of India, before effectively coercing Cyprus into its thrall in 1878.
The exchange of Cyprus essentially gave Britain the Ottoman Empire’s preponderating influence in the Eastern Mediterranean, control over the future destinies of the Levant, as well as over Egypt and Syria. It also gave Britain an overawing position in respect to Asia Minor, by which the Porte would at all times be “kept in check”, and the ability to increase Britain’s commerce to a considerable degree, and to afford the most abundant supplies to their fleets at a trifling expense in a very short space of time.
Not surprisingly the government and people of the Ottoman Empire had mixed reactions to this convention. Some viewed it as a humiliation and a further weakening of Ottoman power and influence. Others expressed feelings of support based on good strategic calculation, military matters and financial concerns, but these were strongly to the tone of reluctant acceptance and desperation. While many saw it as a necessary concession to secure British support against Russian expansionism, expanding upon Britain’s role as their chief ally and protector, they also did so struggling with the discombobulated mess that was all the internal and external challenges they faced, and they believed it would also have alleviated financial strains, while representing a loss of territory and sovereignty, and with that, the erosion of Ottoman prestige.
Because the Cyprus Convention was more than the conventional alliance. It was a flawed and misleading “faustian bargain” with none of the typically expected worldly gains. The Ottomans had sacrificed their principles for immediate benefits, which never materialised, yet had to bare with all the negative and lasting consequences.
And so the story, glory and awe of the Turks, with their timeless legacy of bravery, heroism and perennial success, from rising out of enslavement to grasp their own freedom in their own hands, to the establishment of their grand Turkish Empire - “The Armes of Turkie” - once absorbed alongside tales of the magnificent orient, forever etching them in the annuls of historical legend, these all became the epitomic essence of Ottoman national consciousness and their well-deserved pride:
“Your ancestor, your grandfather, your generation, your father, the most heroic Turkish nation, your armies, many times, showed their glory to the world, Turkish nation, love your nation with pride, damn the enemies of the homeland, let them suffer that damned disgrace” - Lyrics to Ceddin Deden (March of Forefathers), a Turkish Patriotic & War Song (1299–1922)
But now that this once magnificent empire was reduced to a historical epithet: "The Sick man of Europe", and the Ottoman national consciousness degraded to their own perception of their own humiliation, a multi-faceted phenomenon shaped by military defeats, economic dependence, internal challenges, and the rise of insurrectionist nationalism, and now there was this loss of Cyprus, one of the last nails in the coffin.
Meanwhile in Britain, political conversations justifying the acquisition of Cyprus soon made their strongly impassioned appearances in the British House of Commons:12
“In taking Cyprus the movement is not Mediterranean; it is Indian. We have taken a step there which we think necessary for the maintenance of our Empire and for its preservation in peace.” - Benjamin Disraeli, House of Commons (18 July 1878)
While the British Press shows us there were also many mixed reactions there:
(Cyprus is) “an admirable naval station, whether for the purpose of protecting the Suez Canal, securing a second road to India, or giving this country the requisite authority in its relations with the Porte.” - The London Times
(There will be) “limitless cost, unceasing stress, strain, and danger” as never before in English history - The Daily News
“An island, two hundred miles long, ravaged by famine, a nest of malaria, with a fatal fever of which it enjoys a monopoly, without harbours, and possessed of a growing population of lepers, is held by Englishmen adequate consideration for an obligation to spend scores or hundreds of millions in defending an empire which either cannot or will not defend itself.” - Commentator of the Fortnightly Review
And concessions reared to the non-humanitarian motives of acquiring Cyprus, or rather, that it was acquired not in response to some ambiguous “300 gloomy years of Tourkokratia (Turkish rule)”, but out of military calculation, motives which were increasingly explicit and apparent in the speeches of its colonial administrators:13
“It is important at the outset to realize that the action of the British Government in assuming the administration of Cyprus did not result in any way from a regard either for the island or its inhabitants. There was no question, for instance, of rescuing the latter from misrule.” - Charles William James Orr (1918)
And of course you also have the financial factors, which we’ll cover shortly.
So although from the beginning there were doubts about the military value of Cyprus, such as where the British Ambassador Sir Austen Henry Layard, informed by his various unofficial diplomatic missions in European Türkiye and travels in the East, believed that the acquisition of a Place d’Armes in the Persian Gulf might have been better,14 the colonial expansionist hawks - the Disraelis - already had their day.
And so the island was officially leased to Great Britain by the Ottomans, who retained nominal rights over their territory, and the British Administration of Cyprus was soon officially established, while the purveyance of the island’s Turkish character and influence persisted, albeit with the people politically disconnected from the Turkish national whole, and with Britain in complete occupational and administrative control.
But the events that soon followed…
The exploitation of the island’s resources and people, amalgamated with efforts to encourage Greek settler colonisation as a means to tacitly undermine the island’s Turkish character and influence, as well as the total and complete disenfranchisement of the native indigenous population as a direct consequence of these policies, and the terrible debt oppression forced onto these people, it all fueled strong resentment and ultimately contributed to the eventual downfall of British colonial Cyprus.
On the issue of debt oppression:
Despite efforts to paint a bright future for the island, with politicians citing the expected flow of investment capital in the construction of their new Place d’Armes, and their “benevolent administration” that would transform the population into “well-off” British “colonial subjects”, as that is what the islanders ended as, “colonial subjects”, because they were not involved in the negotiations process, they were objects of it.
And not even three years later in 1881 the British Empire landed troops in Egypt and defeated Colonel Arabi’s forces, making them the masters of Egypt, with the ensuing Madhi rebellion in Sudan leading to a permanent military occupation of Egypt and the Suez Canal,15 and direct control of the Suez Canal and the harbour of Alexandria, which meant that Britain no longer needed Cyprus as a Place d’Armes.
Then there’s the Ottoman Empire’s loan of 1855, and its debt which, by 1875, had swelled to £200 Million, while £12 million, half of their revenues, were used to pay the interests of the various loans, leading to their resultant declaration of bankruptcy in 1877.16 And Cyprus became a “solution” which would not lessen the British Minister of Finance’s revenue,17 and where later voices even assured that the Turkish debt had been the main reason for the acquisition of Cyprus, although this is not entirely true.18
Because in 1909 when Winston Churchill, then parliamentary undersecretary in the Colonial Office visited Cyprus, the administrative effectiveness of the government’s debt oppression was so severe that he wrote of this in a memorandum for the British Government, and in very honest terms, which some senior politicians and civil servants considered “an insane minute”, but was in fact very accurate:19
“the oppression of a small community by a great Power for the purpose of pecuniary profit; … that is, in fact, the spectacle which our financial treatment of Cyprus at this moment indisputably presents. It is in my opinion quite unworthy of Great Britain, and altogether out of accordance with the whole principles of our colonial policy in every part of the world, to extract tribute by force from any of the possessions or territories administered under the Crown.” - Winston Churchill (1909)
Just five years later in 1914, Cyprus became the most heavily taxed country in the world in relation to the wealth of its people, and had relieved the British taxpayer by £3,533,136, making it the most exploited colony of the British Empire.
So not only was the island coercively taken through some exploitative and misleading deal with the devil, so to speak, quite literally, and not only was it a big provocation and attack on the Turkish nation and the integrity and security of their mother state, but it was governed in a manner so terrible that anybody would be compelled to rebel.
"The history of liberty is a history of resistance." - Woodrow Wilson, 28th U.S. President
And rebel they did.
And the most crucial part, and this we’ll have to cover in the next article, Britain laid the foundations for the next phase in the Enosis movement, and with it, one of the longest lasting conflicts in history, and a 147-year-old political dispute.
"You should not be asking for colonialism at this day and age, you should be asking for Cyprus be returned to Turkey, its former owner," - British official, responding to Turkish Cypriot requests for continued British rule, highlighting the sentiment of Turkish Cypriots wanting to align with Türkiye rather than Greece.
"We are just Turks. They have their Greece, we have our Turkey. Why should we live under the same state?" - Rauf Denktaş, encapsulating the fundamental rejection of a unified Cypriot state dominated by the settler colonist Greek Cypriots
“Turkish Cypriots are nothing but part of the holy Turkish nation," - Rauf Denktaş, reflecting the nationalist discourse that emphasised the Turkish Cypriot connection to Türkiye and denied the existence of a separate Cypriot identity.
"I am a Turk by culture, language and history, by my deeper self. I do have my state my motherland. All these words like common state, Cypriot culture, Greek Cypriots, Turkish Cypriots are empty words," - Rauf Denktaş, further underscores the Turkish Cypriot identity rooted in Turkish culture and history, rejecting the idea of a shared Cypriot identity.
That is how and when the Cyprus Problem began.
That is the Britannic imperialist foundation of the island’s current troubles.
And within these also lies the answer to its future.
“As long as there’s occupation, there’ll be resistance” - Taysir Suleiman, Former Palestinian Prisoner
Here is an incomplete list of the Ottoman Empire’s various wars and conflicts in the lead-up to the signing of the Cyprus Convention:
In 1771 Egypt and Syria rebelled against Ottoman rule, in parallel with the Russo-Turkish War (1768-74), while the Russian fleet totally destroyed the Ottoman Navy at the Battle of Çeşme (Chesma), until in 1774 the Ottoman Empire signed the Treaty of Küçük Kaynarca, which formally granted Russia protector status over Türkiye's Orthodox Christian subjects, and with it the legal right to interfere in the affairs of the Sublime Porte, and independence to the Crimean Khanate, which in reality became dependent on Russia, until it was annexed in 1783
In 1787 the Russian Empire declared war on the Ottoman Empire following demands it vacates the Crimea after a series of infringements of the Treaty of Küçük Kaynarca, which stirred up public opinion in Constantinople, and the British ambassador lent his support to the war party. Running in parallel to the Austro-Turkish War (1788–1791), as Russia was in alliance with Austria, the Russo-Turkish War (1787-1792) led to Russia capturing Iaşi and Khotyn, followed by Izmail and Anapa, and inflicting a series of defeats on the Turkish Fleet and seizing the initiative in the Black Sea. The Ottomans then signed an assistance pact with Prussia in 1790, but received no help during the war. The war continued until the Treaty of Jassy was signed with Russia in 1792, by which the Crimea and Özü (Ochakov) were left to Russia, the Turla (Dniester) was made the frontier in Europe, and the Asiatic frontier remained unchanged.
In 1804 the Serbian Revolution against Ottoman rule erupted in the Balkans, running in parallel with the Napoleonic invasion, and with support from the Russian Empire during the parallel Russo-Turkish War (1806-1812). By 1817, when the Serbian Revolution ended, Serbia was raised to the status of a self-governing monarchy under nominal Ottoman suzerainty, until it was officially recognised by the Porte in 1829.
In 1806 the Ottoman Empire was dragged by Napoleonic France into a new war with Russia, which took place in parallel with the Russo-Persian War, the Russo-Swedish War and the War of the Fourth Coalition, until in 1811 the Ottomans were forced to conclude a peace treaty beneficial for Russia, according to which Russia gained Bessarabia.
In 1821 the Greek Revolution against Ottoman rule erupted in the Peloponnese, the Danubian Principalities, and surrounding areas. By 1826, when the Ottomans were taking back control, Russia, Britain and France decided to intervene on the side of the Greeks, with each nation sending a navy, intercepting the Ottoman fleet in the battle of Navarino, destroying it completely. In 1928 the Greeks then captured part of Central Greece with the help of a French expeditionary force, and in that same year the Russo-Turkish War of 1828–1829 erupted parallel to the Greek War of Independence, with the resulting Treaty of Adrianople granting autonomy to Serbia, and promising autonomy for Greece, as well as allowing Russia to occupy Moldavia and Walachia, sparking British fears over Russian naval domination of the Mediterranean and control of the land route to the Indian Subcontinent, before an independent Greece was then officially recognised by the Porte in 1831.
In 1831 the Bosnian Uprising against Ottoman rule erupted in the Balkans, seeking greater autonomy from Ottoman rule in response to the reforms implemented by the Sultan to abolish the ayan system, through which a class of local notables or dynasts held significant authority, and replace it with the new pasha's representative system. The uprising was defeated in 1833. Further uprisings took place throughout 1833-1839, 1845 and 1847, and were also driven by similar nationalist aspirations in response to Ottoman reforms.
In 1853 Russia destroyed the entire Ottoman fleet at Sinop, leading Britain and France to conclude that armed intervention on the side of the Ottomans was the only way to halt a massive Russian expansion, and that commercial opportunity in the Ottoman Empire’s need for modern technology and superior weaponry should be exploited, dramatically increasing the money entering via trade, and leading to the uniformization of the tax system with little corruption, which caused further insurrections.
In 1875 the Herzegovina Uprising against Ottoman rule erupted in Herzegovina, from where it spread into Bosnia and Raška, and escalated into a veritable war between the Ottoman Empire and Serbia. This conflict with the Bosnian and Herzegovinian Serbs contributed to the tensions leading to the Russo-Turkish War of 1877-1878, and resulted in the intervention of the Dreikaiserbund on the side of the Serbs, forcing the compromised Ottomans to conclude an armistice.
In 1876 the Bulgarian April Uprising against Ottoman rule erupted in Oborishte, Sredna Gora and a number of towns and villages in the northwestern Rhodopes, before spreading to areas of Gabrovo, Tryavna, and Pavlikeni, along with several villages north and south of Sliven and near Berovo (in present-day Macedonia). The Great Powers (Austria-Hungary, Britain, France, Germany, Italy and Russia) convened at the Tersane Konferansı (Shipyard Conference) in Constantinople and tried to exert considerable pressure on the Ottoman Empire to initiate reforms, but the British secretly backed the Ottomans, enabling them to ignore this pressure.
In 1877 the League of the Three Emperors (Russia, Austria, Germany) and Britain signed in London a protocol asking the Turks to introduce the reforms they had proposed at the Conference of Constantinople (1876-1877). After the Ottomans refused, Russia then declared war, resulting in the new Russo-Turkish War (1877–1878).
In 1878 the British Administration of Cyprus set to work against Ottoman rule on the island, damaging Anglo-Ottoman relations. The revision of the Congress of Berlin, signed in that same year, resulted in the German Empire’s promise to be an "honest broker", whereby the Bulgarian territory was decreased, war indemnities were cancelled. While annoyed at British Prime Minister Benjamin Disraeli, the Sultan had nothing but praise for Otto von Bismarck who forced many of the major concessions upon Russia. These close Germano-Ottoman relations would persist until both empires' very end.
When the government in Konstantiniye (Constantinople) tried to initiate measures to prevent an economic collapse throughout the empire, it touched off a revolt in Herzegovina in 1875. The revolt in Herzegovina quickly spread to Bosnia and then Bulgaria. Soon Serbia also entered the war against the Turks. These revolts were the first test of the new Modern Ottoman Army. Even though they were not up to Western European standards, the army fought effectively and brutally; during the war, the Ottomans carried out the Batak massacre in 1876. Januarius MacGahan, a journalist of the New York Herald and the London The Daily News wrote of the terrible happenings after his visit to Batak with Eugene Schuyler, claims which were supported by Eugene Schuyler's report, published in The Daily News, according to which at least 15,000 persons were killed during the April Uprising in addition to 36 villages in three districts being buried. Even though the likes of Donald Quataert contested that around 1,000 Muslims were killed by Christian Bulgarians and consequently 3,700 Christians were killed by Muslims, and soon the Balkan rebellions were beginning to falter, in Europe, papers were filled with reports of Ottoman soldiers killing thousands of Slavs, while in Great Britain William Ewart Gladstone published his account of Ottoman atrocities in his Bulgarian Horrors and the Question of the East, raising a chance for Russia to embark on a new Russo-Turkish war, which it did the following year, in an attempt to try and partition the Balkan peninsula depending on the outcome. In response to the Russian proximity to the Dardanelles straits the British, against the wishes of the new Sultan Abdul Hamid II, intervened in the war. A large task force representing British naval supremacy entered the straits of Marmara and anchored in view of both the Dolmabahçe Palace and the Russian army. Looking at the prospect of a British entry into the war the Russians decided to settle the dispute. The Treaty of San Stefano gave Romania and Montenegro their independence, Serbia and Russia each received extra territory, Austria-Hungary was given control over Bosnia, and Bulgaria was given almost complete autonomy.
Personal Opinion Time: Western Humanitarianism, A Savage Hypocrisy
In a discussion on the Israel-Palestine Problem, and the ongoing Israeli genocide against the Palestinians, one Claudia von Ayres said: “Muslims should not be given the same freedom to practise their religion like other religions in the West because of the destruction that has come from it.” followed by “Israel is doing absolutely a good job in the MiddleEast and I have faith it will get better there but we need to give it time.” Now I won’t go over the entirety of my response, but I did ask and think it’s worth repeating, when news of Ottoman atrocities in the various uprisings and insurrections reached Great Britain and the European powers, did everyone simply say: "have faith it will get better there but we need to give it time"? Would you have accepted that as a reasonable stance?
Or do you think they said, as in WWII: “PEOPLE OF BRITAIN! WILL YOU STAND THIS?” like when images circulated of No. 2 Wykeham Street, Scarborough, after the German bombardment on 16 December, and the home of a working man was bombed, leaving four people dead in the house including the wife, aged 58, and two children, the youngest aged 5, all of them joining 78 women and children killed and 228 women and Children rounded up by the German raiders…
If you see something like this happening today, will you ENLIST to do something? Will you allow yourself to become a continuation of that brave British tradition of upholding this proud belief in humanitarianism and the idea of a strong commitment to upholding the rights of oppressed populations the world over, to protect your family and your country at home in Britain, and to get along with everyone the world over so as to spread freedom and prosperity to all? Should anything remotely like the London Blitz happening somewhere in this world today not compel you to ENLIST and FIGHT for the very freedom and prosperity you hold so dear?
During the 1876 Bulgarian April Uprising, a trip to 3 cities and 11 villages by one person (Eugene Schuyler) led to their compiling a report detailing the burning of sixty-five villages, the demolition of five monasteries and the slaughter of at least 12,000-15,000 people, rebels and non-combatants alike, with Muslim casualties numbered 115, of whom 12 women and children, even though these claims were largely unsubtantiated and among the cities and villages mentioned not all had been visited by Schuyler's own concession.
Subsequent investigations by the French and Russian Consuls estimated the number of Bulgarian casualties at 25,000–40,000. While official Turkish sources claimed some 18,000 Christian casualties, and approximately 500 Muslim casualties, with Bulgarian sources citing 30,000 casualties on their side and none on the Muslim side.
Irrespective, is that not something to condemn?
Because as you’re reading this and Israel continues its genocidal war on the Palestinians, the official Gaza death toll tops 57,200, with an estimated 100,000-200,000 cited as the likely real figure after the dust settles, and that’s likely already increased, but people still won't condemn that?
And to go back to the Ottoman-Bulgaria case for just a moment, because it helps us understand this "othering" as it pertains to what's going on today.
Because when hearing about the events from faculty members at Robert College, who feared that the coming investigation of Englishman Walter Baring would turn into a cover-up because of the British Empire's strongly pro-Ottoman official stance and his own reputation as a Turkophile, that is what Eugene Schuyler cited as his reason for going. And there’s merit to that position. Without external, third-party, non-biased verification, how could one know exactly what happened?
And Walter Baring, Januarius MacGahan, Eugene Schuyler and William Ewart Gladstone's claims and reactions were accepted despite their acting on a colonial mindset, an ingrained anti-Turkish bias, "othering", offering a vehemently Turkophobic interpretation, as part of their preconceived ideas of Turkish barbarism and guilt or, at best, on pro-Russian leaning.
Meanwhile, Israel's block on international journalists in Gaza today is not only preventing proper scrutiny and accountability of the desperate situation there, it is also being allowed to stand, and Israel’s own stance, with it citing it being a “deadly assignment”, just being accepted, just like that, no scrutiny allowed, nothing.
So during the Bulgarian Uprising, for all the rhetoric and actions that warranted internal domestic criticism and international condemnation of the Ottoman Empire, the fact that there was this freedom and diversity of access to information and the places in question, more than 150 years ago, and where the Ottomans were facing incessant unabated hatred, yet this allows us now to draw reliable and evidenced conclusions based on the historical record, but about what is happening in Palestine today? And has been led up to by the very brutal machinations of that Ottoman hating west since the first quarter of the 20th century?
The term double standards doesn’t even begin to do justice to what this is.
Atleast for what happened in Bulgaria we now know, based on multiple strong, reliable, and cross-verifiable sources, including the works of the American historians Richard Millman, Justin McCarthy and Stanford Shaw, who through their examinations of the documented record and all other potential evidence can authoritatively say that the accepted reality of the massacres is largely a myth, and juxtaposing that with the official figures of the British, Russian and French establishments, and the ardent, rabidly ideological defenders of their inexcusable actions, consumed by their radical zealotry which their efforts not infrequently manifests as, we know from everything, that the hypocrisy of the west is just too far gone.
I just mentioned the work of the American historians, although many in the diaspora Greek and Armenian communities have, in their savage narcissism, for example, attacked and accused Millman of being "… an apologist for the Turkish state” and having “exaggerated the number of Muslim victims in the Balkans” as part of some ambiguous attempt “to underplay the number of Armenian victims in Anatolia", not that this is even relevant, but these criticisms in and of themselves simply just do not stand up to scrutiny.
But this could also have something to do with Richard Millman put Bulgarian casualties at 3,000–12,000, and noting that Russian atrocities against Muslims during the Russo-Turkish War of 1877–1878 were far worse than those against insurgent Bulgarians.
And they weren't condemned.
And Stanford Shaw, in his book History of the Ottoman Empire and Modern Turkey, he observes that based on the historically documented record and collected evidence, far more Muslims than Christians were killed in the uprising, with Bulgarian casualties estimated by him to be fewer than 4,000.
Others admit that the beginning of the April Uprising was accompanied by a massacre of Muslim civilians, while upholding estimates of 12,000 Bulgarian casualties, as others claim the insurgents killed less than 200 Muslims, very few of whom were non-combatants.
Needless to say, the deliberate obfuscation of information, as well as attempts to dismiss and undermine what is otherwise historically documented and evidenced, on the one side, this is all too clear.
Dwight E. Lee, Great Britain and the Cyprus Convention Policy of 1878 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1934), p. 67f.
Dwight E. Lee, Great Britain and the Cyprus Convention Policy of 1878 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1934), p. 45.
Dwight E. Lee, Great Britain and the Cyprus Convention Policy of 1878 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1934), pp. 36, 38.
John MacDonald Kinneir, Journey through Asia Minor, Armenia, and Koordistan, in the Years of 1813 and 1814 (London, 1818), p. 185f, quoted by Lee, op. cit., p. 80. In an similar way Disraeli in a novel in 1848: Benjamin Disraeli, Tankred or the New Crusade (London, 1848) passim.
“… in order to enable England to make necessary provision for executing her engagement, ... the Sultan further consents to assign the Island of Cyprus to be occupied and administered by England.” See: C. W. J. Orr, Cyprus Under British Rule [London, 1918], reprint (London: Zeno, 1978), p. 36.
Part of this “Convention of Defensive Alliance between Great Britain and Turkey, with respect to the Asiatic Provinces of Turkey” is as follows:
“If Batoum, Ardahan, Kars, or any of them shall be retained by Russia, and if any attempt shall be made at any future time by Russia to take possession of any further territories of His Imperial Majesty the Sultan in Asia, as fixed by the Definitive Treaty of Peace, England engages to join His Imperial Majesty the Sultan in defending them by force of arms.”
“In return, His Imperial Majesty the Sultan promises to England to introduce necessary Reforms, to be agreed upon later between the two Powers, into the government, and for the protection of the Christian and other subjects of the Porte in these territories.”
“And in order to enable England to make necessary provision for executing her engagement, His Imperial Majesty the Sultan further consents to assign the Island of Cyprus to be occupied and administered by England.”
These were regarding the “Mussulman Religious Tribunal”, “Superintendence and Administration of Mussulman Schools and other Religious Establishments in Cyprus”, “Excess of Revenue over Expenditure to be paid by England to Turkey”, “Power reserved to Porte to Sell and Lease Lands and other Property of the Crown and State in Cyprus”, “Purchase of Land by English Government”, and “Conditions of Evacuation of Cyprus by Great Britain”.
The articles are as follows:
“I. That a Mussulman religious Tribunal (Mehkéméi Shéri) shall continue to exist in the island, which will take exclusive cognizance of religious matters, and of no others, concerning the Mussulman population of the island.”
“II. That a Mussulman resident in the island shall be named by the Board of Pious Foundations in Turkey (Evkaf) to superintend, in conjunction with a Delegate to be appointed by the British Authorities, the administration of the property, funds, and lands belonging to mosques, cemeteries, Mussulman schools, and other religious establishments existing in Cyprus.”
“III. That England will pay to the Porte whatever is the present excess of revenue over expenditure in the island; (this excess to be calculated upon and determined by the average of the last five years, stated to be 22,336 purses, to be duly verified hereafter, and to the exclusion of the produce of State and Crown lands let or sold during that period.)”
“IV. That the Sublime Porte may freely sell and lease lands and other property in Cyprus belonging to the Ottoman Crown and State (Arazii Miriyé vé Emlaki Houmayoun) the produce of which does not form part of the revenue of the island referred to in Article III.”
“V. That the English Government, though their competent authorities, may purchase compulsorily, at a fair price, land required for public improvements, or for other public purposes, and land which is not cultivated.”
“VI. That if Russia restores to Turkey Kars, and the other conquests made by her in Armenia during the last war, the Island of Cyprus will be evacuated by England, and the Convention of the 4th of June, 1878, will be at an end.”
Dwight E. Lee, Great Britain and the Cyprus Convention Policy of 1878 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1934), p. 113.
C. W. J. Orr, Cyprus Under British Rule [London, 1918], reprint (London: Zeno, 1978), p. 46.
Dwight E. Lee, Great Britain and the Cyprus Convention Policy of 1878 (Cambridge: Harvard Univer sity Press, 1934), pp. 117-122.
David K. Fieldhouse, Die Kolonialreiche seit dem 18. Jahrhundert (Frankfurt: Fischer, 1965), p. 146.
Nicolae Jorga, Geschichte des Osmanischen Reiches nach den Quellen dargestellt, V, (Gotha: Perthes, 1913), pp. 540ff.
The British share of the loan amounted to 3.815.200 £ and the annual interest to 3.815.200 £.Orr, op. cit., p. 48.
Lord Hailey, The Future of Colonial Peoples (Oxford, 1943), p. 9 versicherte “Cyprus was ceded by Turkey in 1874 (sic) in payment of a debt to Great Britain”, quoted by Hill, p. 466.
“By the Convention of 1878 we bound Cyprus to pay a tribute to the Sultan of 92,800 £. This Convention was made for our own purposes, because it was then thought a matter of high military importance to have a place of arms and strategic base in the Levant whence Egypt and Constantinople could be surveyed. The Cypriotes were not consulted by us in fixing the amount of the tribute. They never agreed to it, and it was fixed upon the basis of what Turkey declared she had been able to screw out of the island by regular Turkish methods. We were anxious, however, to have the island, and could not afford, or did not care, to boggle about the terms, particularly as they affected only other people’s interests. Reviewing this original transaction, I cannot help thinking it improper. I do not think that we ought ever to have consented to make ourselves the agents of collecting the hatefully oppressive taxes by which the Turk has crushed and ruined so many of his tributary provinces. But that is only half the transaction.[...] the fact stares me none the less in the face that we have no right whatever, except by force majeure, to take a penny of the Cyprus tribute to relieve us from our own just obligations, however unfortunately contracted. There is scarcely any spectacle more detestable than the oppression of a small community by a great Power for the purpose of pecuniary profit; and that is, in fact, the spectacle which our financial treatment of Cyprus at this moment indisputably presents. It is in my opinion quite unworthy of Great Britain, and altogether out of accordance with the whole principles of our colonial policy in every part of the world, to extract tribute by force from any of the possessions or territories administered under the Crown.” See: George Georghallides, “Churchill’s 1907 Visit to Cyprus: A Political Analysis,” Thetis 2 (1995), pp. 189-192.